Comments on: Screenwriting 101: Gaming the Characters

By: melon

melon — Thu, 22 May 2008 01:47:14 +0000

It’s an interesting subject. I don’t have much to add, as I haven’t done too much thinking regarding game theory before, but it’s certainly a valuable tool in the screenwriter’s arsenal.

By: Scrupo

Scrupo — Fri, 16 May 2008 04:27:28 +0000

Very astute. As a soap watcher I’m very familiar with the structure of the storytelling and yes who telling whom is a key part in the story. Each character’s reaction to X news is a major factor in the viewing experience. Whenever something major happens to me the next most exciting thing is not the fall-out of the directly involved characters but the other characters reactions to it.

By: Tiffany

Tiffany — Thu, 15 May 2008 09:28:25 +0000

This whole entry is interesting, but your bolded “who tells whom is just as important as what is being related” is the most interesting.

I never thought of it that way, but YES, in general, I find that part of the telling as least as intriguing as the information itself, both in fiction and in real life. Another aspect is the “you didn’t hear it from me” conditions that people give. The person wants you to know, but does not want other to know your source.

By: Dave

Dave — Thu, 15 May 2008 05:54:22 +0000

The solution to the pirates problem:

It’s easier to get the solution by working backwards. If the first three votes resulted in pirates getting killed off, the final division would look like this: Pirate #4 would give himself 100 coins, and Pirate #5 would get none. Naturally, Pirate #5 would rather get even one coin than zero, so he doesn’t want this situation to come to pass.

For this reason, if there were three pirates, Pirate #3 would keep 99 coins and give 1 coin to Pirate #5 – and Pirate #5 would vote to keep the one coin, rather than vote it down and walk away with nothing.

With 4 pirates, Pirate #2 would give one coin to Pirate #4 for the same reason – Pirate #4 knows that the vote will play out like in the previous paragraph, and he’ll get nothing. Pirate #2 and Pirate #4 can pass the vote between the two of them, since Pirate #2 holds the tiebreaking vote.

So the final solution to the problem is: Pirate #1, knowing that the other pirates have already calculated what will happen to them if only 4, 3, or 2 pirates remain, gives Pirate #5 one coin, gives Pirate #3 one coin, and keeps 98 coins for himself. The vote passes, because Pirates #3 and #5 know if it comes to Pirate #2 to divide the coins, they’ll get nothing.

It’s important to realise that every pirate understands not only how to maximise his own take, but also that every other pirate understands exactly how to maximise theirs as well. 98 coins to the Pirate Captain might seem a little counterintuitive, but the Game Theory math bears it out.